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ARE STATES DENIED A VOICE?:
CITIZEN-DRIVEN FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER CROSBY V. NATIONAL
FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL
INTRODUCTION
"If selective purchasing had been banned ten years ago, Nelson
Mandela might still be in prison today."' The author of this state-
ment, Massachusetts State Representative Byron Rushing, hoped that
the Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act ("Massachusetts Burma
Law" or "MBL") would be as successful in undermining Burma's
repressive regime as were the state anti-apartheid laws of the 1980s.
Massachusetts passed the first-ever, state-wide law in 1996 to con-
demn Burma's deplorable human rights record and to discourage cor-
porate investment in the Burmese government, which sponsored slav-
ery, torture, and human trafficking.2 The MBL barred state agencies
from purchasing goods or services from any person or corporation
doing business with Burma. This was certainly not the first state ef-
fort to influence foreign affairs-twenty-three states, fourteen coun-
ties, and eighty cities enacted either divestment or procurement legis-
lation to limit corporate investment in South Africa's apartheid re-
gime.3 Such laws had been upheld by lower courts in the past and
were credited at least in part with toppling South Africa's apartheid
government.
In April 1998, the National Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC"), a
lobbying group boasting 600 corporate members, launched a lawsuit
Leslie Miller, Wide Impact Possible from Decision Axing Burma Law, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Nov. 6, 1998, at 1.
2 MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West 2001); see John Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (describing Burmese villagers' allegations that
Unocal was complicit in the Burmese government's human rights violations against the villag-
ers in connection with the Yadana Natural Gas Pipeline project joint venture); Mark B. Baker,
Flying Over the Judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth
of Massachusetrs, the WTO, and the Federal Courts, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 51, 70 (2000)
("During the period 1992-97, Human Rights Watch/Asia estimated that approximately two
million Burmese people were used for forced labor to make the Burmese infrastructure more
attractive for foreign investment and tourists.").
3 Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 821,822 (1989) (describing non-federal government involvement in foreign affairs).
793
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
against the MBL that culminated in the June 2000 Supreme Court
decision in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.4  The Su-
preme Court invalidated the MBL as preempted by a federal Burma
law because it stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress [under the fed-
eral Act]." 5 The Court decided the issue on preemption alone and
declined to address whether the MBL violated the Foreign Affairs
Power or the Dormant Commerce Clause6 as the First Circuit had
held.7 The NFTC proclaimed that the Crosby decision "should put an
end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy."8 But did it?
After Crosby, the key question is whether states have any remain-
ing ability to use their procurement or divestment functions to influ-
ence corporate behavior and foreign policy. Crosby will certainly in-
validate a number of local government procurement laws that target
countries, such as Burma, that already are addressed by federal sanc-
tions laws.9 However, several states and municipalities have enacted
procurement and divestment laws targeting countries either not sub-
ject to any federal law or targeting a condition, such as labor rights,
which may not be preempted under Crosby's narrow holding.10 Other
laws have been drafted to conform to the Natsios ruling, and their
future under Crosby is equally uncertain.
Crosby left unanswered key issues that are sure to be the subject
of future challenges. First, does the Foreign Affairs Power prohibit
states from stepping in where the federal government has not acted to
promote human rights, environmental protection, and labor rights
abroad, or are they reduced to making largely symbolic proclama-
tions? Second, may states, acting as private market participants, direct
4 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
5 Id. at 377.
6 Hereinafter "Dormant Commerce Clause" or "Foreign Commerce Clause."
7 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (lst Cir. 1999), afd sub nom.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding MBL unconstitutional).
This Note will refer to the Supreme Court decision as Crosby, the First Circuit's decision as
Natsios, and the District Court decision, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d
287 (D. Mass. 1998), affd sub nom. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), as
Baker. Defendants Crosby, Natsios, and Baker each served as Secretary of Administration and
Finance of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts during different phases of the MBL litigation.
For sake of brevity, National Foreign Trade Council will be abbreviated as NFTC.
8 Press Release, NFTC, Supreme Court Rules Massachusetts Burma Law Unconstitu-
tional Judgement of First Circuit Affirmed (June 19, 2000), at http://www.usaengage.org/su-
premecourt.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
9 See Miller, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that twenty-three U.S. cities have laws prohibit-
ing city governments from contracting with companies doing business in Burma); Jonathan
Ringel, High Court Ruling Hurts Dade's Anti-Cuba Law, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., June 20,
2000, at 3 (reporting that Crosby ruling may effectively invalidate provisions similar to the
MBL which violate a federal law, including the Miami-Dade ordinance).
10 See infra Parts II.A-B.
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state resources away from companies doing business in certain for-
eign countries without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?
This Note will examine the Foreign Affairs and Dormant Commerce
Clause Powers as applied to state laws and predict whether procure-
ment and divestment laws will survive in a post-Crosby environment.
I. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE MASSACHUSETTS BURMA LAW
A. The Massachusetts and Federal Burma Laws
The MBL prohibited state officials and their agents from pur-
chasing goods and services from any person or entity (U.S. or for-
eign) that did business with Burma unless the party's bid price was
ten percent lower than the prices of all other bids received." The
MBL defined "doing business with Burma" to include firms with a
principal place of business or a majority-owned subsidiary in Burma
or firms with other types of business with the government.12  The
state was required to maintain a restricted purchasing list of all corpo-
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West 2001). Section 22J(a) states: "The
secretary shall establish and maintain a restricted purchase list. . .. [which] shall contain the
names of all persons currently doing business with Burma (Myanmar)." Id. § 22J(a).
Section 22H(a) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a state agency, a state au-
thority, the house of representatives or the state senate may not procure
goods or services from any person listed on the restricted purchasing list
maintained by the secretary, or who is determined through affidavit or
through other reliable methods to meet the criteria for being so listed.
li § 22H(a).
Section 22G defines "Doing business with Burma (Myanmar) [as]:
(a) having a principal place of business, place of incorporation or its cor-
porate headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any operations,
leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries, distribution agreements,
or any other similar agreements in Burma (Myanmar), or being the ma-
jority-owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise of such a person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma (Myanmar),
including providing direct loans, underwriting government securities,
providing any consulting advice or assistance, providing brokerage ser-
vices, acting as a trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent
pursuant to a contractual agreement;
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or other
related products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the gov-
ernment of Burma (Myanmar) from Burma (Myanmar);
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma
(Myanmar).
Id § 22G.
Section 22G defines "Comparable low bid or offer" as "a responsive and responsible bid or
offer which is no more than ten percent greater than the lowest bid or offer submitted for goods
or a service." Id.
12 Id. §22G.
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rations doing business in Burma. 13 The state could select a contractor
from that restricted list only if (1) it was an essential procurement and
(2) there was no comparable bid from a company without business in
Burma. 14 Corporations were exempt from the ban if (1) their sole
business in Burma was to report the news or provide goods and ser-
vices for international communications 15 or (2) if their only business
was the sale of medical supplies or devices.16 In submitting their bids
on any state contract, the corporations had to attach an affidavit stat-
ing that they did no business in Burma. 17 Massachusetts wielded sig-
nificant purchasing power through the MBL; the annual state pro-
curement budget is two billion dollars. 18 In response, companies vo-
ciferously protested being forced to choose between the lucrative state
contracts and their business in Burma.' 9 Some large U.S. companies,
including Apple, Kodak, and Hewlett-Packard, unilaterally pulled out
of Burma, citing the MBL as the primary reason.
20
Three months after the passage of the MBL, Congress passed a
comprehensive sanctions program for Burma in Title II of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1997.2' The federal Burma Law ("FBL") authorizes the Presi-
dent to prohibit all new investment in Burma by U.S. citizens and
corporations by executive order. The President initiates the sanctions
by certifying to Congress that "Burma has physically harmed, rear-
rested ... or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-
scale repression of or violence against the [d]emocratic opposition."2
The President must report to Congress every six months from the
sanctions' start date whether the sanctions should remain in place or
be lifted based on his assessment of the political situation in Burma.2
3
The FBL prohibits new investment, which includes "a range of activ-
ity concerning 'the economical development of resources located in
's Id. § 22J.
14 Id. § 22H.
15 Id.
16 Id. § 221.
17 Id. § 22H.
18 Brief for Respondent at 11, Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474).
19 See USA Engage, State and Local Sanctions Undermine Engagement, at
http://www.usaengage.org/studies/statelocal.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2002) (arguing that sanc-
tions reduce engagement with foreign countries which, in turn, stifles democratic and human
rights reforms).
20 Tea Party: States' Rights: Massachusetts v. Myanmar, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at
32.
21 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1997, §570, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-166, 3009-166-67 (1996) (codified at
31 C.F.R. Part 537 (2001)).
22 Id. § 570(b).
23 See id. § 570(d).
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Burma." ' 24 However, FBL specifically exempts the sale and purchase
of goods, services, and technology if U.S. companies are not paid
with shares or profits from any new investment.2 The FBL also
charges the President to work with U.S. trading partners and allies to
fashion a multilateral solution to the human rights situation in
Burma. 6 In May 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order
13047, initiating the sanctions and the ban on new investment in
Burma by United States persons.2
B. The NFTC-Massachusetts Lawsuit
In April 1998, the NFTC filed a complaint alleging that several
of its corporate members had been harmed by the MBL.28 The district
court granted a permanent injunction against the MBL, finding as a
matter of law that the MBL impermissibly infringed on the Foreign
Affairs Power of the federal government. 29 The court did not address
in detail the NFTC's claims that the MBL was preempted by the FBL
or that the MBL violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.30 In June
1999, in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,31 the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and
invalidated the MBL on two additional grounds-that the MBL dis-
criminated against foreign commerce and was preempted by the
FBL.32
In June 2000, the Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, holding
that the MBL was preempted by the FBL. The Court found that even
without an express preemption provision in federal law, a state law
must yield to a federal act if Congress intends to occupy the field, or
where a state law is "naturally preempted" to the extent it conflicts
with a federal law.33 The Court noted that preemption was found (1)
where it was impossible for a private party to comply with both the
2 NFrC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,47 (1st Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. Crosby v. NFFC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
2 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997,
§ 570(f)(2). The sale and purchase of all goods, with limited exceptions, were banned under the
MBL. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
2 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997,
§ 570(c) at 289-90 n.5.
27 Exec. Order No. 13,047,31 C.F.R. 537 (2001).
2 See NFTC v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289-90 n_5 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd sub nom.
NFrC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), affid sub nora. Crosby v. NFrc, 530 U.S. 363
(2000) (noting that one member who formerly had contracts with the state declined to bid be-
cause of the MBL and one member lost a state contract because its bid was not ten percent
lower than the winning bid).
29 Id. at 289.
30 See id at 293 (holding that neither argument is dispositive, but offering observations).
31 181F.3d at 38.
32 1& at45.
3 See Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363,372 (2000).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
state and federal rule, and (2) where the state law was an obstacle to
the accomplishment of Congress' purposes and objectives. 34 The
Court found that the MBL undermined the intended purpose of Con-
gress in three ways. First, the MBL prevented the delegation of effec-
tive discretion to the President to control economic sanctions against
Burma because the presence of individual and disparate state acts re-
duced the President's authority and negotiating power with the Bur-
mese government and other countries.3 5 Second, the MBL's sanctions
were far broader and more absolute than the FBL's. MBL applied to
all corporations and to all current investment and had no end date.
Congress carefully considered and rejected sanctions similar to the
MBL and adopted instead a calibrated sanctions approach to achieve
maximum leverage with the Burmese government.36 Although the
MBL and FBL shared a common goal, their substantive inconsistency
undermined Congress' careful calibration of force. Third, MBL con-
flicted with the President's authority to speak for the United States
among nations in developing the comprehensive, multilateral Burma
strategy intended by Congress.37 As evidence that the MBL under-
mined the President's ability to speak for the United States in foreign
policy, the Court pointed to the diplomatic protests and lawsuit initi-
ated by the European Union and Japan in the World Trade Organiza-
tion alleging that the MBL violated the Agreement on Government
Procurement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.38
As a result, the Court explained, the national government was em-
broiled in international dispute processes with its diplomatic partners
about a state law.39
The Court's decision will certainly invalidate a number of state
and local laws which, like the MBL, are directed against a country
which is the subject of a federal law. Currently, twenty-three cities,
including New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Portland, Ore-
gon, have laws prohibiting municipal governments from contracting
34 Id. at 372-73.
35 See id. at 377 (noting that if the Massachusetts law is enforceable, then the President
has less to offer and less economic and diplomatic leverage).
36 See id. at 377-78.
31 See id. at 380.
38 Id. at 382-83; see also Burma: As High Court Reviews Case, EU, Japan Drop WTO
Panel on State Law Burma Ban, Int'l Trade Daily News (BNA) (Feb. 16, 2000) (discussing
issues before the Supreme Court); Japan: Tensions Eased by Fuji-Kodak Settlement, But Minis-
try Says U.S. WTO Violations Rising, Int'l Trade Daily News (BNA) (Mar. 31, 1999) (citing the
MBL as a problem area with U.S.-Japanese trade relations). Massachusetts is a sub-national
signatory to the General Procurement Agreement. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 5
n.6, Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474), available at
http://www.usaengage.orglbackground/lawsuit/massscbrief.html (last visited Mar. 8,2002).
39 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367-68.
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with companies doing business in Burma.4° Even before Crosby was
decided, commentators argued that the Miami-Dade County anti-
Cuba ordinances that restrict the transaction of business with all firms
doing business in Cuba would be preempted.41 The Miami-Dade
County ordinances were more restrictive than those under the federal
Helms-Burton Act of 199642 and, unlike Helms-Burton, contained no
exemption for cultural and informational exchanges. In Miami Light
Project v. Miami-Dade County,43 the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida found that Miami-Dade County's requirement that
prospective contractors sign an affidavit stating they had never trans-
acted business with nor traveled to Cuba violated the Foreign Affairs
Power and enjoined the ordinances. In addition to emphasizing that
the U.S. government must speak with one voice on Cuba policy, the
court noted the ordinances significantly exceeded the scope of the
Helms-Burton sanctions and specifically referenced the absence of an
exemption for cultural exchanges. 44 Since then, several state laws
have been challenged as violative of the Foreign Affairs Power, with
mixed results.45
This Note will evaluate several procurement and divestment laws
either currently proposed or in force and attempt to predict which
might survive after Crosby. Preliminarily, this Note argues that di-
vestment laws and procurement laws that target a condition, such as
environmental, human rights, and labor rights, as opposed to a spe-
cific country, are more likely to satisfy the Foreign Affairs Power and
Dormant Commerce Clause. Part II will discuss how current laws
might fare under a Foreign Affairs Power challenge. Part I will dis-
cuss whether the laws can survive a Dormant Commerce Clause chal-
40 Miller, supra note 1, at 2.
41 Angela T. Puentes, Comment, The Politics of Music and Film: The Validity of a Local
Government's Cultural Embargo on Cuba, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253 (2000) (dis-
cussing the anti-Cuban ordinances, Miami-Dade County, Res. No. R-202-96 and Admin. Order
3-12 (2000)).
42 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-
6091 (Supp. V 1999).
43 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
44 Id. at 1180 (finding that the "Cuba Affidavit" is an independent foreign policy with
more than an incidental effect on Cuba).
45 See In re World War I Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that California law providing a cause of action to victims of the
forced labor practices of the Nazi regime and its allies was unconstitutional because "it infringes
on the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs"); Gerling Global Reinsurance
Corp. of Am. v. Quackenbush, No. CIV S-00 0506, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8815, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. June 9, 2000) (enjoining implementation of California's Holocaust Victims Insurance Re-
covery Act on grounds that it impermissibly touched on Foreign Affairs Power), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
2001) (affirming the injunction, but holding the state law did not violate the Foreign Affairs
Power), cert. dismissed sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low, No. 00-1926, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 607
(Jan. 22, 2002).
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lenge, with and without a market participant exemption. The Note
concludes by summarizing the general features needed to survive
these challenges.
Assuming that no federal law or policy expressly or impliedly
preempts state and local laws, they will have to survive independent
challenges under the (1) Foreign Affairs Power and (2) Dormant
Commerce Clause. The next section addresses the former issue, and
the section following addresses the latter.
II. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
The Foreign Affairs Power stands for the proposition that the
federal government, not the states, possess paramount authority to
conduct the foreign policy of the United States.46 The Foreign Affairs
Power is not found in any express provision of the Constitution, but
rather is derived from various provisions and the structure of the Con-
stitution.47 Some scholars argue that states are allowed some role in
foreign affairs, but the precise boundaries of that role are unclear. For
example, Professor Louis Henkin argues that while "[t]he language,
the spirit, and the history of the Constitution deny the states authority
to participate in foreign affairs ... states have variously and inevita-
bly impinged on U.S. foreign relations. ' 48 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether state laws regulating in a traditional state
area violate the Foreign Affairs Power in Clark v. Allen49 and Zscher-
nig v. Miller.50 In Clark, the Court upheld a California probate law
conditioning the right of foreign nationals to inherit property located
in that state on a reciprocal right for U.S. citizens to inherit in that
country.51 The Court ruled that California's statute did not extend
state power into the field of foreign affairs, as there was "no treaty
governing the rights of succession... [and] California [had not] en-
tered the forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country ....
or making a compact with it contrary to the prohibition of Article I, §
10 of the Constitution., 52 Therefore, California's law had only an
46 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 1 (1987); LOUIS HENKIN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION 13-16, 149-51 (2d ed. 1996) (citing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1987)).
47 See HENKIN, supra note 46, at 13-16.
48 See id. at 150, 162; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § I cmt. 5
(1987) ("Subject to the limitations indicated, State law and State judicial decisions continue to
affect the foreign relations of the United States as they do other national policy.").
49 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
50 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
51 Clark, 331 U.S. at 517 (holding that the statute was not affected by overriding federal
policy).
52 Id. at517.
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"incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."53 The Court held
that local law properly determined inheritance rights, unless an over-
riding federal policy, such as a treaty, makes "different or conflicting
arrangements." 5 If so, the state law must give way.
In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon probate statute that
required proof that foreign heirs would actually receive Oregon estate
proceeds without confiscation.55 The Court held that "the history and
operation of this statute.. . is an intrusion by the state into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress. 56 The Oregon statute "unduly interferes with the United
States' conduct of foreign relations... for it has more than some in-
cidental or indirect effect in foreign countries, and [a] great potential
for disruption or embarrassment." 57 Unlike the probate law in Clark,
which the Court found required only a "routine reading of foreign
laws,"58 the Oregon statute, as applied, led to "minute inquiries con-
ceming the actual administration of foreign law, into the credibility of
foreign diplomatic statements, and into speculation whether the fact
that some received delivery of funds should 'not preclude wonder-
ment as to how many may have been denied the "right to receive."'.
' 59
This type of statute, the Court noted, made "unavoidable judicial
criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our
own.'"6° The Court concluded that despite the fact that probate issues
were traditionally regulated by the states, a state's policy may disturb
foreign relations even in the absence of a treaty and that the Oregon
law "has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well ad-
versely affect the power of the central government to deal with those
problems., 61 Noting the cumulative effect of the state probate laws,
the Court observed that "the Oregon law does... illustrate the dan-
3 id.
54 Id. The Court compared the Clark situation to Blythe v. Hinchley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901),
which upheld a California law that granted aliens a right to recover in the absence of a treaty
and rejected arguments that this additional law was a forbidden entry into foreign affairs.
-5 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
56 Id. at 432.
57 Id at 434-35. The Court noted the embarrassment caused by the formal protest from the
government of Bulgaria in response to State Land Board v. Rogers, 347 P.2d 57 (Or. 1959).
" Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433. The Court stated that its ruling in Clark had been limited to
the plain language of the California probate statute and that appellant conceded that the probate
court had confined itself to a routine reading of foreign law. The Court noted that had Clark
appeared in the posture of Zschernig, a different result might have obtained. The district court
found the statute unconstitutional because of a clear legislative intent to prevent American assets
from reaching hostile nations, but appellant did not raise this issue in the Supreme Court. See
id. at 432-33, 433 n.5.
51 Id. at435.
60 Id. at 440. Opining that probate court decisions "radiate" the Cold War attitudes of
judges, the Court quoted a probate judge exclaiming, "I am not going to send money to Russia
where it can go into making bullets which may one day be used against my son." Id. at 435 n.8.
61 Id. at 441.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
gers which are involved if each State, speaking through its probate
courts, is permitted to establish its own foreign policy."62
The precise boundaries of Zschernig are unclear as it remains the
sole case in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a state law gov-
erning a traditional state function under the Foreign Affairs Power. 63
Some scholars argue that because the Supreme Court has not revisited
Zschernig and because the Zschernig majority did not overrule Clark,
Zschernig may not automatically preclude state legislative activity.
There are two key views-first, that Zschernig can be read at a low
level of generality to invalidate only those state actions that reflect a
"state policy critical of foreign governments and involve 'sitting in
judgment on them"'; 64 second, that Zschernig distinguishes between
state actions with an indirect or incidental impact on foreign relations
and those that directly intrude on the conduct of foreign affairs. 65
Thus, a court would "balance the degree to which a local enactment
intrudes upon foreign affairs against the degree to which the enact-
ment falls within the ambit of traditional state powers. 66
In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,67 the First Circuit
affirmed the trial court's holding that the MBL was invalid under
Zschernig because it had "more than 'an indirect or incidental effect
in foreign countries,' and has a 'great potential for ... embarrass-
ment. ' 8 Rejecting the argument that Zschernig requires the court to
balance the nation's foreign policy interests against the state interest,
the court held that there is "a threshold level of involvement in and
impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed." 69  Then,
62 Id.
63 See generally HENKIN, supra note 46, at 165 (discussing Zschernig's unique holding).
But see Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398 (1969).
6 See HENKIN, supra note 46, at 164; Lily Batchelder, Note, The Costs of Uniformity:
Federal Foreign Policymaking, State Sovereignty, and the Massachusetts Burma Law, 18 YALE
L. & PoL'Y REv. 485, 489 (2000) (discussing the interpretation of Zschernig at a "low level of
generality"). However, Professor Henkin notes that even this approach would "condemn also
'sense resolutions' on foreign policy by state legislatures though such resolutions are not law
and could not be invalidated, and state legislatures presumably cannot be prevented or enjoined
from adopting them." HENKIN, supra note 46, at 164.
65 See HENKIN, supra note 46, at 164 (discussing Zschernig's lack of specificity regarding
state actions that are excluded from its coverage).
6 Lucien J. Dhooge, The Wrong Way to Mandalay: The Massachusetts Selective Pur-
chasing Act and the Constitution, 37 AM. Bus. LJ. 387, 437 (2000) (discussing Constitutional-
ity of South African Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 65 (1986)). Under a balancing approach, Professor Henkin suggests that "certain
impingements on foreign affairs are excluded because national uniformity is required; infringe-
ments are barred if they discriminate against or unduly burden our foreign relations; the courts
will balance the state's interest in a regulation against the impact on U.S. foreign relations."
HENKIN, supra note 46, at 164.67 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aj'd sub nom. Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
6" Id. at 51.
69 Id. at 52.
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the court concluded that the MBL had more than an incidental effect
on foreign relations by considering the following five factors. 70 First,
the MBL was not facially neutral and the legislative intent was to
"sanction Burma... to pressure the Burmese government to change
its domestic policies." 71  The court emphasized that "by targeting a
foreign country, monitoring investment in that country, and attempt-
ing to limit private interactions with that country, [the MBL] goes far
beyond the limits of permissible regulation under Zschernig.7 2 Sec-
ond, the state, with its two billion dollar per year procurement budget,
was capable of effectuating the law's intent.73 Third, as in Zschernig,
the court stressed the cumulative negative effect of multiple local and
state sanctions laws, which taken together added up to a direct impact
on foreign affairs. 74 Fourth, the MBL caused disruption and embar-
rassment because the U.S. had been besieged with international pro-
tests against the MBL.75 Also, unlike in Zschernig,76 senior State De-
partment officials and members of Congress complained that the pro-
liferation of local sanctions laws undermined the federal ability under
the FBL to achieve a multilateral strategy in Burma. Fifth, the court
noted that the MBL differed in at least five respects from the FBL,
thus causing potential embarrassment. 77 Thus, even if the MBL pro-
moted a legitimate state interest, it violated the Foreign Affairs Power
because it had a direct impact on foreign affairs and caused embar-
rassment and disruption.
Under a balancing approach, where the federal interest must be
overriding to displace state law under the Foreign Affairs Power,78 the
court may have found Massachusetts' arguments more compelling.
First, although the legislature intended to condemn the atrocious con-
duct of a foreign country, the MBL also expressed a powerful state
interest in controlling local procurement. Second, assuming that the
Zschernig test is still relevant to a balancing approach,79 it is arguable
'0 Id. at 53.
71 i.
72 I. at 56.
73 It. at 53.74 mt/
75 See id.; see also Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363, 382-83 (2000) (noting the numerous
complaints about the MBL from the European Union and Japan).
7 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (noting that the U.S. amicus curiae brief argued that the
Oregon probate statute did not unduly interfere with U.S. foreign policy).
'7 Natsios, 181 F.3d at53.
78 Other courts may balance the federal and state interests. See Miami Light Project v.
Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (emphasizing the sensitivity of
U.S.-Cuban relations because "in this hotbed of foreign affairs, it is of paramount importance
that the federal government be recognized as the 'one voice' of all Americans") (emphasis
added).
79 See supra text accompanying note 57.
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that the MBL did not present the same direct impact on foreign affairs
as did the probate laws overturned in Zschernig. The MBL neither
required the state to make "minute inquiries concerning the actual
administration of foreign law,,80 nor required the state to delve "into
the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements"81 that seem to consti-
tute the Court's chief concern in Zschernig.82 By contrast, the First
Circuit held that the MBL "clearly establishe[d] ongoing scrutiny, by
creating a "mechanism for ongoing investigation into whether com-
panies are doing business with Burma.,8 3 While the court acknowl-
edged that the MBL did not require the state to inquire into the human
rights situation in Burma, still, by scrutinizing the actions of private
companies, the state was "evaluating developments abroad in a man-
ner akin to the Oregon probate courts in Zschemig."84 But Zschernig
was not concerned with state monitoring of the behavior of private
actors, such as companies, but with local government and judicial
inquiries into the actual administration of foreign law. However,
even under a balancing approach, a court may find that the state's
targeting of a foreign country, and its intent to have an actual impact
in that country, albeit indirectly by discouragement of third-party in-
vestment,8' is a sufficient state pronouncement against a foreign gov-
ernment.86 Additionally, the MBL caused actual disruption or embar-
rassment for the U.S. under Zschernig because of the international
protests it generated. Thus, a court may find that the MBL had more
than an incidental effect on foreign affairs because of the federal gov-
ernment's interest in uniformity, despite the state's compelling inter-
est in controlling state procurement and the absence of minute inquir-
ies into foreign law under the MBL.
80 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
8l Id.
82 Id. at 435 n.6 (describing a probate court's analysis of "the general nature of rights in
the Soviet system instead of examining whether Russian inheritance rights were granted equally
to aliens and residents. The court found Russia had no separation of powers, too much control
in the hands of the Communist Party, no independent judiciary, confused legislation, unpub-
lished statutes, and unrepealed obsolete statutes .. " The court characterized the testimony of a
leading Soviet jurist's interpretation of Russian inheritance rights law as "modeled after Humpty
Dumpty, who said, "When I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less.'") (citation omitted).
83 NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. Crosby v. NFTC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 52.
86 See supra text accompanying note 72.
[Vol. 52:793
2002] CITIZEN-DRIVEN FOREIGN POLICYAFTER CROSBY 805
A. Local Divestment and Purchasing Laws and the Foreign Affairs
Power
The Note will now consider whether local procurement and di-
vestment laws could survive a challenge under the Foreign Affairs
Power as defined by Zschernig, Crosby, and lower court opinions.
1. Divestment Laws
Numerous local governments have enacted laws that require state
officials to invest no new funds in financial institutions or companies
that provide loans or do business with certain countries and to divest
funds currently held in these entities.87 The divestment bills and laws
are based upon laws enacted in the 1980s to oppose the apartheid re-
gime in South Africa. This Note argues that divestment laws, espe-
cially those not targeting a specific country, would survive a Foreign
Affairs Power challenge because Crosby's decision can be limited to
procurement laws, and the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
whether a divestment law would violate the Foreign Affairs Power.
88
Further, divestment laws do not raise the same Zschernig concerns
expressed by the First Circuit in Natsios regarding the impact of a
state law on a foreign country and the federal government's ability to
conduct foreign policy.
" See H.B. 3165, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999) (An Act Relative to Divesti-
ture of Public Pension Funds from Companies Doing Business with or in Indonesia), LEXIS
1999 Bill Text MA H.B. 3165; H.B. 3177, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999) (An Act
to Further Regulate State Contracts and Investments with Companies Doing Business with or in
Indonesia), LEXIS 1999 Bill Text MA H.B. 3177; H.B. 3369, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess.
(Mass. 1999) (An Act to Regulate the Investment of Public Service Funds Relative to the In-
vestment in Companies Doing Business in or with Burma), LEXIS 1999 Bill Text MA H.B.
3369; A.B. 9514,2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (An Act to Amend the State Finance
Law in relation to Depositing of State Funds in Banks Doing Business in China, Sudan, Indone-
sia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Morocco,
Laos and Vietnam and in Relation to State Contracts with Entities that Do Business in Such
Countries), LEXIS 1999 Bill Text NY A.B. 9514; ALAMEDA CoUNTY, CAL., ADMiN. CODE, ch.
4.32 (1997) (Burma Divestment), at http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/admin/admincode/Ala-
medaCountyAdministrative_C...010.htm (on file with author); N.Y. CrrY LOCAL LAW 33,
Int. No. 647-A (1997) (Divestment of City Funds in Banks Doing Business in Burma), at
http./fleah.council.nyc.ny.us/law97int647a.htm (on file with author).
88 Compare Thomas A Barnicio, The Road from Burma: State Boycotts After Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 19 B.U. INT'I LJ. 89, 109-10 (2001) (arguing that Crosby's
narrow preemption grounds allows state and local governments "to act as catalysts for federal
action") with Carol E. Head, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Constitutional Implications
for State and Local Investment Restrictings Impacting Foreign Countries, 42 B.C. L. REV. 123,
171-72 (2000) (proposing a 'functional' Foreign Affairs Power test, and concluding that state
and local actions, including divestment laws and investment decisions, may touch "on foreign
affairs" and "continue to be subject to criticism under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power").
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First, a state court has upheld a divestment law under the Foreign
Affairs Power. In Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore,89 the
Maryland Court of Appeals found that a Baltimore ordinance divest-
ing city pension funds from corporations with investments or business
with South Africa did not invoke the Foreign Affairs Power. The
court reasoned that Zschernig "circumscribes, but apparently does not
eliminate, a state's ability under certain circumstances to take actions
involving substantive judgments about foreign nations." 9 The court
then noted: "The fatal flaw in administration of the Oregon... statute
was not that state law touched on foreign affairs, but the detailed,
case-by-case judicial inquiries into foreign practices that the law en-
tailed. Therefore, a single, general decision by a state mandating the
divestment of state funds arguably would be beyond the scope of
Zschernig."91
The court then balanced the state and federal interests and con-
cluded that "investment policy for public pension funds is ordinarily
governed by local law, and no federal treaty or statute preempts the
enactments . . in this case." 92 Moreover, the law's effect both on
South Africa and on corporations investing in South Africa was
thought minimal and indirect because "when a state sells its stock in a
corporation doing business in South Africa, it has no immediate effect
on foreign relations between South Africa and the United States." 93
The court emphasized several factors contributing to the law's mini-
mal impact: the law required no minute inquiries into a foreign coun-
try, but instead represented a single decision beyond the scope of
Zschernig; the city did not itself scrutinize the activities of private
companies, it used a list prepared by an independent, non-profit or-
ganization; it targeted only companies with significant investments in
South Africa; and it divested at a gradual pace.94 Thus, a state may
rely on Board of Trustees for the premise that a divestment law, even
"9 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Lubman v. Baltimore City, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990). Baltimore Ordinance No. 765 reads: "[N]o funds... shall remain invested in, or in
the future be invested in, banks or financial institutions that make loans to South Africa or Na-
mibia or companies 'doing business in or with' these countries." Baltimore used the Africa
Fund's annual report, entitled the "Unified List of United States Companies with Investments or
Loans in South Africa and Namibia," to identify the entities. Divestiture of current funds was to
occur within a two-year period. The Board of Trustees could suspend divestiture if (1) the rate
of return was substantially lower than the average of annual earnings over the past five years
and (2) continued divestiture will be inconsistent with generally accepted investment standards
or (3) divestiture would cause financial losses to the funds. Id. at 724.
90 Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 746.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 748.
93 Id. at 747.
94 Id. at 724, 747.
[Vol. 52:793
2002] CITIZEN-DRIVEN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER CROSBY 807
one targeting a particular country, does not touch impermissibly on
foreign affairs.
Second, neither the First Circuit in Natsios nor the Supreme
Court in Crosby addressed whether a divestment law, as opposed to a
selective contracting law, violates the Foreign Affairs Power or is
preempted by a federal law.95  In National Foreign Trade Council v.
Baker,96 the district court rejected analogies between the MBL and
Baltimore's ordinance, holding that "the Baltimore statute only modi-
fied the City's own conduct, and did not seek to influence ... compa-
nies in their private commercial activities.' 97 The First Circuit
agreed, noting that "Board of Trustees, whether rightly or wrongly
decided, does not alter our decision that the Massachusetts Burma
Law... goes far beyond the limits of permissible regulation under
Zschernig.' '98  The Supreme Court noted it had no occasion to con-
sider a divestment law in Crosby.99 In Miami Light Project, the court,
in enjoining the Miami-Dade Cuba ordinances, distinguished Board
of Trustees, noting that the divestment law required no continual
monitoring of a foreign situation and had an incidental impact on
South Africa, "because it precluded only companies doing a signifi-
cant amount of business with South Africa." 1°° Thus, a state may ar-
gue that Crosby's narrow holding applies only to state procurement
laws that are preempted by federal law and that Board of Trustees still
supports the constitutionality of divestment laws.
Clearly, if future courts follow the balancing approach in Board
of Trustees, current divestment laws will pass a Foreign Affairs
Power challenge. Two bills, introduced in the Massachusetts State
Legislature, divest current and future state pension funds from com-
panies operating in Burma and Indonesia.101 A hybrid investment-
" See Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363,388 (2000); NFfC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,56 (lst
Cir. 1999).
96 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998), aftd sub nom. NFrC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nor. Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).'
97 Id. at 292.
98 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 56.
99 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. In Crosby, Massachusetts argued that the MBL was not
preempted because Congress was aware of the law and failed to expressly preempt it in the 1997
FBL. It pointed to the fact that Congress refused to preempt state and local divestment laws
targeting South Africa even when Congress repealed the federal level South Africa sanctions.
The Court, in rejecting this preemption argument, noted: "Since we never ruled on whether state
or local sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s were preempted or otherwise invalid, argu-
able parallels between the two sets of federal and state Acts do not tell us much about the valid-
ity of the MlL]." I&
10o Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (S.D. Fla.
2000).
101 Note that neither of the Massachusetts bills have been adopted.
1999 Mass. H.B. 3369 § 2 provides:
No public pensions funds... shall remain invested in the stocks, secu-
rities, or other obligations of any company doing business in or with the
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procurement bill in the New York State Assembly requires the state to
assess whether a financial institution does business with fifteen coun-
tries when deciding whom to use for future investment of state funds
and other financial services. 102 Its investment and procurement func-
tions will be considered separately.10 3 Commentators contend that
states could defend their divestment laws because they "reflect strong
and legitimate local interests... regarding the appropriate disposition
of local public pension or other funds; that they have only an indirect
... impact on foreign relations; that they relate to concerns on which
Congress, although fully aware of these... local activities, has delib-
erately not taken preemptive action.
'1°4
Following this reasoning, states may argue under Board of Trus-
tees that their divestment laws have an incidental impact on foreign
affairs. State and local governments certainly have a powerful interest
country of Burma... ; provided, however, that if sound investment pol-
icy so requires, the [investment] Board may vote to spread the sale of
such stocks, securities, or other obligations of such company over no
more than three years, so that no less than one-third the value of said in-
vestment is sold in any one year, so long as any funds remain invested in
any stocks, securities, or other obligations of any such company, the...
Board shall annually... file with the clerk of the Senate and the clerk of
the House of Representatives a report listing all such related investments
H.B. 3369, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. § 2 (Mass. 1999), supra note 87.
1999 Mass. H.B. 3165 provides:
Public pension funds... shall be divested from any bank or financial
institution that directly or through its subsidiaries has outstanding loans
to the Republic of Indonesia or its instrumentalities, and assets shall be
divested from stocks, securities, or other obligations of any company do-
ing business in or with the Republic of Indonesia according to the fol-
lowing timeline: Not less than twenty-five percent shall be divested by
the first year of enactment; thereafter, funds shall be totally divested by
the third year of enactment.
H.B. 3165, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999), supra note 87.
102 Note that A.B. 9514 was resubmitted to the 2001-02 N.Y. Assembly as A.B. 1777,
2001 Leg., 224th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001), LEXIS 2001 Bill Text NY A.B. 1777. AB. 9514,
2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87, provides that state officials will,
when choosing among banks of comparable cost, seek to invest and deposit funds in banks with
the highest state rating for compliance with the state policy of not supporting countries with
Christian persecution.
Section 2 provides that the state will develop a rating system to "evaluate whether banks
are using the means at their disposal to comply with any United States trade or financial sanc-
tions imposed upon China, Sudan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey,
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Morocco, Laos or Vietnam ...." In addition, the state will
evaluate whether the banks are taking the following actions: withdrawal of operations from the
countries, denial of loans, letters of credit, and other banking services to the countries, restric-
tion on rescheduling of loans, and divestiture of outstanding debt owed by the named countries.
103 New York's bill requires the state to invest, deposit funds and contract for financial
services only with banks that comply with its criteria. It could be argued that this provision
imposes a direct harm on the banks, as they, like a company under a procurement law, stand to
lose a lucrative business. Thus, the Note will consider only the divestment features of this bill.
104 Bilder, supra note 3, at 831.
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in directing investment of public funds. The divestment decision is a
single act to refrain from investing state funds in certain companies,
which obviates the need for minute inquiries into a foreign situation.
Thus, divestment has a lesser impact on foreign affairs, both eco-
nomically and politically, than does procurement. In balancing the
state and federal interests, the Maryland court found that divestment
alone would not cause companies to leave South Africa, reasoning
that a company may decide to retain its investments rather than be-
come eligible for the city's investment. 05 Moreover, scholars argue
that there is a fundamental difference in effect between avoiding in-
vestment in a company and avoiding trade with that company.' °6 Un-
der the Massachusetts and New York bills, a company may lose a
stockholder, but the harm is mitigated because the stock can always
be resold. Thus, the harm to the company's bottom line may be indi-
rect or minimal.1°7 Certainly, a company suffers a more direct type of
economic harm when it loses a state contract, than when its stock
changes hands from one purchaser to another. Additionally, the harm
to companies is indirect because the Massachusetts divestment laws,
unlike the MBL, provide a gradual time-line for divestment, 10 so a
company or bank would not experience a large or sudden sale or
transfer. The New York bill, like the Baltimore ordinance, has an
opt-out provision allowing the state to use a non-compliant financial
institution if it cannot obtain the needed services elsewhere."' 9 Thus,
the new bills contain provisions that mitigate the financial effects on
the financial institutions and companies, and on the foreign countries
themselves.
States can also argue that the potential for disruption or embar-
rassment required under Zschernig will not materialize with divest-
105 Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,746 n.6 (Md. 1989).
106 Robert Stumberg, Preemption & Human Rights: Local Options After Crosby v. NFTC,
32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 109, 149-50 (2000) (arguing that divestment laws will pass a pre-
emption challenge after Crosby because they do not affect the foreign investment under the FBL
and lack a direct economic effect). Professor Stumberg's comprehensive article proposes a
wide range of options for state and local governments to survive a post-Crosby preemption
challenge. These include divestment, primary boycotts, disclosure, shareholder agreements, and
political speech. Id. at 130.
1o7 Symposium, States' Rights vs. International Trade: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 377 (2000) (quoting Professor Peter J. Spiro: "With
divestiture you are talking about marginal changes in the stock price, not a difference in the
bottom line").
'08 See H.B. 3165, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999) and H.B. 3369, 1999 Leg.,
181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999), supra note 87. But see ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN.
CODE, ch. 4.32 (1997), supra note 87 (requiring divestiture of country funds within 120 days).
New York's bill has no such provision, possibly because it governs new deposits and invest-
ments of state funds.
109 A.B. 9514, 2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 3 (N.Y. 1999) allows the Commissioner of
Taxation and Finance to use a bank not meeting the human rights criteria set forth in 9514 § 2.
See supra note 87.
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ment laws. Currently, there is no multilateral agreement on invest-
ment or divestment to conflict with a state divestment law, in contrast
with the GATT procurement regulations at issue in the MBL case.
The Executive Branch has expressed official approval of divestment
as an approach." 0 Therefore, the current divestment bills neither con-
tradict an agreement signed by the U.S., nor seem to impinge on the
government's ability to conduct foreign affairs, which caused the ac-
tual embarrassment in Crosby.
Even if divestment laws have a lesser impact on foreign affairs
than procurement laws, a court may nonetheless find that the New
York and Massachusetts bills have a direct impact on foreign affairs
under the stricter threshold test of the First Circuit. There, the court
held that the MBL had more than an incidental effect on foreign af-
fairs based on five factors, three of which are still present in the cur-
rent divestment laws. These include: (1) the laws target a particular
foreign country and are intended to change policy in that country; (2)
New York and Massachusetts have the purchasing power to effectuate
the law's intent; and (3) the laws may spawn similar laws in other
states.'
The divestment bills, like the MBL, target specific countries and
are intended to have an impact in those countries. The Baltimore
Anti-Apartheid ordinance was adopted for the express purpose of in-
fluencing corporations to "take . .. steps in opposition to apart-
heid."" 2 Similarly, the new bills are enacted to discourage companies
and financial institutions from dealing with identified countries that
persecute Christians and participate in slavery. Thus, divestment laws
targeting countries do have a direct impact on foreign affairs. Sec-
ondly, the state's investment power may be able to force a company
to make a choice between investment abroad and state patronage.
However, as discussed above, this may be a lesser injury to the com-
pany than the loss of profits under a state procurement contract.
Even if the New York and Massachusetts divestment laws are a "bell-
wether" for other states, this factor alone cannot rise to a direct impact
on foreign affairs. However, the New York and Massachusetts di-
vestment laws, by targeting a specific country and evincing a clear
1o See Constitutionality of South African Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local
Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49, 67 (1986) (concluding that state divestment laws
are constitutional, and advising the U.S. not to file suit to invalidate them), 1986 WL 213238;
see also infra note 169 and accompanying text.
III See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
"12 Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 724 n.6. The Maryland court did not find the specific
targeting of South Africa to be significant, as its analysis focused on the absence of minute
inquiries into a foreign country. This suggests the court may have erred in applying Zschernig,
where the Supreme Court invalidated a facially neutral law.
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clear intent to change that country's policy, may be vulnerable to a
Foreign Affairs Power challenge under the First Circuit's approach.
If a divestment law targeted a condition-such as human or labor
rights-states could argue that the divestment law applied to all in-
vestment sources, regardless of foreign holdings, and thus does not
directly touch on foreign affairs. In Trojan Technologies v. Pennsyl-
vania,113 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
Pennsylvania's "Buy American" law did not violate the Foreign Af-
fairs Power because the law applied equally to all countries, whether
friend or foe, and did not inquire into the nature or law of foreign re-
gimes.1 14 Similarly, a state could argue that, like the general reciproc-
ity statute in Clark, the divestment law enables city funds to be in-
vested in companies that share the state's interest in human rights or
fair labor practices. A condition-specific divestment law has all the
positive features-indirect economic and political impact--of di-
vestment laws and lacks the country targeting that resulted in the in-
validation of the MBL.
States may also minimize the targeting of foreign countries and
prevent charges of on-going scrutiny abroad prohibited under Zscher-
nig by emphasizing the neutral condition and avoiding criticism of
specific countries. For example, Professor Strumberg reports that the
California Public Employees Retirement Fund ("CalPers") recently
adopted a policy that the fund "will avoid unnecessary risk by avoid-
ing stock companies that trade or invest in unstable and undemocratic
nations." 5 Thus, state fund selection criteria could include consid-
eration of a company's record in human and labor rights and envi-
ronmental protection because these factors have an impact on the
long-term stability and profitability of the investment. Similarly, in
Board of Trustees, Baltimore avoided on-going scrutiny into South
Africa's political affairs and corporate investments by adopting the
Africa Fund list of companies doing business in South Africa,
116
which was developed by an independent organization. Such tech-
niques may further minimize the state's criticism of a foreign nation
while preserving its right to invest funds consistent with the principles
of its citizens.
"' 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
114 Id. at 913.
"5 See Strumberg, supra note 106, at 150.
16 See Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,724 n.6 (Md. 1989). Butsee
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22J (West 2001) (directing the state to consult reports of the
United Nations, Investor Responsibility Research Center, and Associates to Develop Democ-
ratic Burma, and other reliable (and independent) resources when formulating the restrictive
purchasing list).
20021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In sum, divestment bills targeting a particular condition, but not a
country, will survive a Foreign Affairs Power challenge because (1)
Crosby is limited to procurement laws preempted by a federal law;
and because (2) the indirect nature of the divestment transaction has
only an incidental impact on foreign affairs, and does not cause dis-
ruption or embarrassment. Divestment laws targeting a specific coun-
try still may be vulnerable to challenge under the stricter threshold
test of the First Circuit in Natsios. The threshold test is the most re-
cent and preferred interpretation of Zschernig principles and has been
applied in several recent Foreign Affairs Power challenges,11 7 while
the sole authority supporting targeted laws and the balancing ap-
proach is Board of Trustees.!18 In addition, courts may be unwilling to
conduct the case-by-case analysis required under a balancing test,
particularly in the realm of foreign affairs, traditionally the province
of Congress and the executive branch. A divestment law targeting a
condition will survive because of its incidental economic and political
impact and absence of targeting. Such a law may better serve state
interests-while the state cannot publicly condemn any particular for-
eign government through the law, its broader scope will serve to dis-
courage human rights abuses internationally.
2. Procurement Laws
This Note will now examine three selective contracting laws cur-
rently proposed or in force under the Foreign Affairs Power.119 Prior
to the MBL, several courts considered whether state "Buy American"
procurement laws violated the foreign affairs power, with mixed re-
sults. In the earliest case, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commis-
sioners,12° a California court invalidated the state's Buy American
117 See NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,52 (st Cir. 1999), affd sub non. Crosby v. NFTC,
530 U.S. 363 (2000); Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739,753 (9th
Cir. 2001) (reversing the District Court's holding that California's Holocaust Victims Insurance
Recovery Act violated the Foreign Affairs Power and holding instead that Zschernig did not
apply because the law did not target specific countries, unlike the MBL in Natsios); In re World
War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(drawing Foreign Affairs Power analysis factors from Gerling and Natsios including: "a [statu-
tory] purpose to influence foreign affairs directly," and that the "statute targets particular coun-
tries."). See also Batchelder, supra note 64, at 490-91 (arguing that the prior Supreme Court
case law reflects a threshold approach to foreign affairs analysis).
"' Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 746-48 (noting the ordinance's minimal state intrusion on
the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs and the local state interest in ensuring that
the City's pension funds were not invested in a manner offensive to beneficiaries and other
Baltimore residents).
"9 See A.B. 9514, 2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87; H.B. 3177,
1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999), supra note 87; City of North Olmsted, Ohio Res.
No. 97-9 (1998), available at http://www.ci.north-olmsted.oh.us/Council/PASSED/97-/97-
9.PDF (on file with author).
'20 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969).
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law because, like the probate statute in Zschernig, the state law has a
great potential for embarrassment and "may bear a particular onus to
foreign nations since it may appear to be the product of selfish pro-
vincialism." 121 Later, in Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania'22 and
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission,'23 the courts held that neither the Pennsylvania nor the
New Jersey "Buy American" laws constituted an intrusion by the
state into foreign affairs' 24 Unlike the probate judges in Zschernig,
the courts emphasized that, under the Buy American laws, state offi-
cials did not make minute inquiries into the ideologies or politics of
other countries and that the laws applied uniformly to all countries.
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. distinguished Bethlehem Steel by noting
that, unlike the California law, the New Jersey statute allowed the
state to suspend the Buy American provisions if the cost was unrea-
sonable or inconsistent with the public interest.1l 5 In addition, the
California court in Bethlehem Steel found its law to be inconsistent
with the federal Buy America Act and held that the state law should
not be permitted to operate in the same sphere.1 6 Absent preemption
by a federal law, states may argue that selective contracting laws, par-
ticularly those not targeting a particular country, would pass a Foreign
Affairs Power challenge under Trojan Technologies and K.S.B. Tech-
nical Sales Corp.
Under Crosby, procurement statutes targeting countries already
the subject of a federal law would be preempted. This Note argues
that state procurement laws not preempted by a federal sanctions re-
gime remain vulnerable to challenge because, under Zschernig and
Natsios, if they target a specific country and expressly intend to un-
dermine a particular regime through their measures.
For example, a bill proposed in the New York State Assembly
prohibits the state from contracting with corporations with business
activities in countries that persecute Christians. 27 Despite the bill's
121 Id. at 805.
'22 916 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
'23 381 A.2d 774 (NJ. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
24 Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913; KS.B. Technical Sales Corp., 381 A.2d at 782.
25 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., 381 A.2d at 788.
12 Bethlehem Steel Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.8.
127 A.B. 9514, 2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87, targets: China,
Sudan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Cuba, Iran, North Korea,
Iraq, Morocco, Laos, and Vietnam.
§ 4 of the bill provides:
"[N]o state agency shall contract for the supply of goods, services or
construction with any person who does not agree to stipulate... as a ma-
terial condition to the contract... (1) that the contractor and its affiliates
shall not during the term of such contract sell ... goods or services [to
the countries mentioned above], (2) that none of the goods to be supplied
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added exceptions and reference to the federal sanctions against certain
countries, the bill will not survive a Foreign Affairs Power challenge.
First, under a balancing approach, the state has a powerful interest in
managing procurement. Contracting, like probate law, is traditionally
a state interest. As there is no treaty, legislative action, or an execu-
tive branch policy addressing Christian persecution, the state can ar-
gue there is no overriding federal interest at stake. In the absence of
direct federal action, New York can argue there is no current overrid-
ing federal interest that would preclude its procurement law. How-
ever, the plain language of the bill shows New York's intent to di-
rectly influence foreign policy, to protest the failure of the federal
government to take sufficient action, and to sanction certain regimes
in the absence of federal government action.'18 Similarly, Massachu-
setts conceded that its purpose in enacting the MBL was to condemn
the Burmese government's human rights record and change its do-
mestic policies. 129 Moreover, the New York bill will probably be
invalidated for its very specificity, as it singles out fifteen countries
by name.
Under the stricter threshold test, the New York bill would auto-
matically fail, because it targets specific countries and pertains to sub-
ject matter (human rights issues, including persecution of Christians)
that is part of ordinary diplomatic relations between the U.S. and
every other country. In Zschernig, the Court held that the Oregon
probate statute had a direct impact on foreign relations with the Soviet
bloc even in the absence of a treaty or specific federal policy govern-
ing inheritance issues. 30 Under Zschernig, even if the federal gov-
to the state originated in [the countries above], (3) [that] contractor or its
affiliates do not do business [in the countries above] or are... actively
engaged in the withdrawl of their operations [from the countries above],
(4) it shall not make new investments in [countries above], (5) if... dur-
ing the course of contract the contractor acquires an entity which is do-
ing business in [countries above] the contractor shall initiate withdrawal
or its acquisition's operations from these countries."
A.B. 9514,2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 4 (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87.
128 Id. § 1 (noting that "the legislature believes that the cessation of Christian persecution.
has not been accorded the priority it deserves on the... foreign policy agenda... [A]bsent
actions by the government... against countries that persecute Christians, it is appropriate for..
New York to act on behalf of persecuted Christians ...").
129 See NFrC v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass 1998) (quoting Massachusetts
State Representative Byron Rushing as stating that the "identifiable goal [of the MBL] is, free
democratic elections in Burma") (citation omitted), affid sub nom. NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub noma. Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). The First Circuit later
commented that given this concession by the state, it was irrelevant that Massachusetts claimed
it was merely expressing moral outrage over Burma conditions and that it would have enacted
the MBL regardless of whether the law had an impact in Burma or not. See NFTC v. Natsios,
181 F.3d 38,52 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub noma. Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
130 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,441 (1968).
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ernment has failed to act, the New York bill still represents an unwar-
ranted intrusion into foreign affairs.
Secondly, the bill allows the state to directly engage representa-
tives of foreign governments that will result in the "minute inquiries"
into the actual administration of foreign law prohibited by Zschernig.
Section 4 of the New York bill requires the state to assess whether
contractors who are withdrawing from specific countries have en-
gaged in good faith efforts to negotiate with local trade unions regard-
ing the termination of local employees. 131 Thus, the bill has a direct
influence on foreign affairs because of the bill's clear intent to sup-
plement a "vacuum" at the federal foreign policy level and its unusual
intrusiveness into the laws of a foreign country. A court will find the
potential for great embarrassment because the bill targets a U.S. ally
(Turkey) and other countries with which the U.S. is trying to improve
relations (Vietnam, Iran). Since the bill is tied to existing federal
sanctions, 132 a court may invalidate the bill under the foreign affairs
power for intruding where Congress has already spoken.
A second procurement bill is pending in Massachusetts. 133 After
the First Circuit's decision, the Massachusetts House of Representa-
tives modified the MBL language to craft a new procurement law
aimed at Indonesia. This bill (1) requires the state to develop a re-
stricted purchase list of companies for Indonesia and (2) exempts con-
tracts that are covered under the GATT procurement agreement. The
bill's conformity with the GATT provisions reduces its direct impact
on a federal treaty and potential for embarrassment under Zschernig.
However, the Indonesia bill would still fail because it targets a coun-
try and requires the state to scrutinize private investment abroad.
Third, a City of North Olmsted, Ohio resolution requires
contractors to certify that goods supplied to the city were not
produced under sweatshop conditions.' 34 The striking aspect of the
resolution is that it does not target a specific country nor does it
"' A.B. 9514,2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 4(J)(2) (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87.
132 Id. §§ 2-4. The New York bill requires, in order to receive a state contract, all persons
to stipulate as a material condition of the contract that he or his affiliates have not within the
twelve months prior to the award of such contract violated and shall not during the period of
such contract violate any federal sanctions imposed on any countries named in the bill. Id.
133 H.B. 3177, 1999 Leg., 181st Legis. Sess. (Mass. 1999), supra note 87 provides: "A
state agency that is subject to the international Government Procurement Agreement may pro-
cure goods and services from a person who is on or who is so determined to meet the criteria of
the restricted purchase list for Indonesia only, if the value of the contract to be awarded is not
less than $500,000 for procurement of goods or services... or not less than $7 million for pro-
curement of construction services."
134 North Olmsted's resolution provides: "The administration shall maintain a policy of
evaluating suppliers products concerning the working conditions under which the products are
manufactured... [t]o the extent possible, goods from suppliers who will not state that their
products are not made under sweatshop conditions will not be purchased." City of North Olim-
sted Ohio Res. No. 97-9 (1998), supra note 119. Sweatshop conditions are defined as: (1) em-
ploying children in labor under age 15, and (2) forced labor or prison, indentured or bonded
20021
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that it does not target a specific country nor does it directly target
conditions abroad. Like the Buy American laws upheld in Trojan
Technologies and K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., North Olmsted's
resolution is uniformly applicable to any products the city procures,
whether from foreign or domestic sources. Under a balancing test, the
city's interest in controlling the quality of city procurements should
prevail, since the law does not conflict with an overriding federal pol-
icy or law. Under Zschernig's threshold test, the law would also pass
because it applies equally to domestic companies and does not affect
foreign affairs.
135
The North Olmsted resolution may run afoul of Zschernig's pro-
hibition of minute inquiries, as it requires the city to inquire into the
specific working conditions of contractor-supplied goods. The law
defines minimum standards and requires that every worker be in-
formed of the standards, where consistent with foreign law. 136 Be-
cause neither the enforcement mechanisms nor the contract award
criteria are specified, it is unclear how the city will assure the absence
of sweatshop conditions. If the city accepts the contractor's certifica-
tion that goods are not produced in sweatshops at face value, then the
law requires no minute inquiries. Unlike the Massachusetts or New
York bills, North Olmsted is not required to collect data or monitor
foreign conditions or corporate activity abroad.
While Massachusetts may have the purchasing power to influence
a company's investment decisions abroad, a small city with fewer
resources clearly has only an incidental impact on foreign policy. The
North Olmsted resolution, by itself, would have a limited potential for
diplomatic embarrassment in the absence of a treaty.137 However, a
court could still find the city's resolution a "bellwether" for similar
local intrusions into foreign affairs and invalidate it, less for its actual
impact than to prevent a proliferation of local laws that cumulatively
labor. The resolution requires (1) payment of adequate wages in conformity with the country's
law, (2) hours in conformity with the country's law, (3) environments free from physical, sexual
or verbal harassment and the right to form unions, and (4) safe and healthy working environ-
ment. See id.
135 Id. The preamble states: "[l]t is the desire of this council to support the rights of citi-
zens around the world to work in a safe and healthy workplace at reasonable compensation by
not purchasing products made under sweatshop conditions."
136 The resolution requires: "These standards must be communicated to every worker,
supervisor and manager in the factory, orally and in writing, in the language understood by each
person." Id.
137 This Note does not consider the effectiveness of the various laws in effecting political
change. The fact that the North Olmsted resolution, because of its lack of specificity, may suc-
cessfully pass a legal challenge does not make it an effective reform mechanism.
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would have a highly negative effect.138 Thus, North Olmsted's resolu-
tion may also be invalidated.
The greater a law's specificity and the greater the burden a state
imposes on private corporations, the less likely a procurement law
will survive a Foreign Affairs Power challenge. Yet it is precisely
through the specific requirements that a state can affect corporate be-
havior through its purchasing power. Procurement and divestment
laws may be upheld if they do not target specific countries, 139 al-
though procurement laws remain vulnerable to invalidation under the
First Circuit's approach because they cause direct economic impact.
Scholars recognize that state actions always have some impact on for-
eign affairs, 14° and this impact will continue to grow as countries be-
come increasingly dependent on global trade. State and local laws can
be viewed as one essential forum for the expression of dissent and
public opinion in foreign affairs.14 1 Since foreign affairs are the least
transparent of the federal functions, a judicial policy allowing for pro-
curement laws not targeting a country would allow communities one
"" In Zschernig, the Court noted that the Oregon law shows the dangers involved if each
state is allowed to conduct a foreign policy through its probate courts. See Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429,441 (1968).
139 Additional evidence that courts may uphold state laws if they do not target specific
countries can be found in the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Gerling Global Reinsurance
Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Low], cert. dismissed sub nom.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low, No. 00-1926, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 607 (Jan. 29, 2002). In Low, Califor-
nia's Insurance Commissioner appealed an injunction of California's Holocaust Victim Insur-
ance Relief Act ("HVIRA") which had been challenged by insurance companies and a trade
association. Id. at 741. HVIRA required all insurance companies doing business in California
to comply with state reporting requirements regarding the resolution of Holocaust-em claims.
Id. at 741-42. The Insurance Commissioner was required to suspend certificates of authority for
failure to comply. See i& The lower court held that HVIRA violated the Foreign Affairs Power
because it potentially conflicted with the United States' efforts to resolve Holocaust-era claims
with foreign governments and had great potential for embarrassment. Gerling Global Reinsur-
ance Corp. of Am. v. Quackenbush, No. CIV. S-00-0506, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8815, at *21-
*28 (E.D. Cal. June 9 2000). Thus, HVIRA had "[mI]ore than an [i]ncidental [e]ffect in
[f]oreign [c]ountries." ld. at *32. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction, but held that the
district court erred in its Foreign Affairs Power analysis. Low, 240 F.3d at 751. The Court
distinguished Natsios, because, unlike the MBL, HVIRA did not refer to any particular country,
and "there [was] no evidence that HVIRA would be applied in a way that would implicate the
diplomatic concerns mentioned in Zschernig." Ld. at 753. The Court concluded that "HVIRA,
on its face, involves commerce alone, and it is not, on its face, directed at any particular foreign
country." I. On remand, the district court granted Gerling's motion for summary judgment on
Due Process grounds and enjoined California from suspending insurer licenses for failure to
comply with the HVIRA reporting requirements. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am.
v. Low, No. CIV. S-00-0506, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16072, at *42-43 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2,2001).
140 See Bilder, supra note 3, at 821-22 (citing sister-city exchanges, local economic
development programs, and cultural exchanges as permissible state activities).
141 See Jason F. Hellwig, Note, The Retreat of the State? The Massachusetts Burma Law
and Local Empowerment in the Context of Globalization(s), 18 WIs. INT'L L.J. 477,479 (2000)
(discussing the democratization of foreign policy); Brief of Amici Curiae New York City et al.,
at 9-10, Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474), LEXIS 1999 US. Briefs 474.
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avenue to express their concerns, at least until the federal government
decided to act.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Assuming that divestment or procurement laws are not invali-
dated by the Foreign Affairs Power, they also must pass muster under
the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Constitution grants Congress
the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among
the several States."142 Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state
cannot advance its legitimate goals by means that facially discrimi-
nate against foreign commerce, absent a compelling justification.1 43
Massachusetts argued that it was acting as a market participant in
state procurement and, therefore, the Commerce Clause restrictions
did not apply to the MBL. The market-participant exemption has not
been applied to the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Supreme
Court did not address the issue in Crosby. Commentators have sug-
gested that the market-participant exemption should be extended, ar-
guing that limiting the exemption to interstate commerce would result
in a logical inconsistency-a state could discriminate against out-of-
state commerce, but must offer identical terms of trade to foreign and
in-state commerce. 144 States supporting the MBL argued that the
Court's cases reflect a trend towards supporting states' rights and
enabling states to "serve as laboratories for social and economic ex-
periments,"' 45 so extending the market-participant exemption would
enable states to be politically accountable to community values re-
garding the use of state funds. '46 If a state's citizens wish its gov-
ernment to avoid products produced by Burmese slave labor, and are
aware that their taxes will be used to pay a slightly higher price for
goods, a state should be able to incorporate the externality into its
prices. This Note will analyze local divestment and procurement laws
assuming a market-participant exemption and under the traditional
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
142 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "Although the Commerce Clause is by its text an affirma-
tive grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause has long
been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing
substantial burdens on such commerce." South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (holding that Alaska's in-state timber processing requirement was a market
regulation and therefore invalid under the Commerce Clause).
145 See, e.g., Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Finance, 505 U.S. 71
(1992) (invalidating an Iowa tax provision that treated dividends received from foreign subsidi-
aries differently as violative of the Foreign Commerce Clause).
144 For policies supporting extension of the market-participant exemption, see Batchelder,
supra note 64, at 491. See also Brief of Amici Curiae New York City et al., supra note 141, at
8-9.
145 Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,441 (1980) (citation omitted).
146 See Batchelder, supra note 64.
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A. Market-Participant Exemption
The Court first articulated the market-participant exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.
147
In Hughes, the Court upheld Maryland's law offering a bounty to en-
courage local processing of inoperable automobiles although the law
favored in-state scrap processors over out-of-staters. Noting that the
state had entered the market to protect its environment, the Court
ruled that "[niothing in the purposes . . . of the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from partici-
pating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others."' 48
Following Hughes, the Court applied the market-participant ex-
emption in other domestic Commerce Clause cases. In Reeves v.
Stake,'49 the Court upheld South Dakota's policy to limit sales of
state-produced cement to state residents only. First, the Court held
that South Dakota, as a seller of cement, was a market participant. A
public entity acts as a market participant when it buys, sells, or func-
tions in the marketplace, because it takes on private business ele-
ments.150 In contrast, a state is a regulator and is covered by the
Commerce Clause when it imposes taxes or regulations in the mar-
ketplace. Second, the Court held that the state could withdraw its ce-
ment from the out-of-state market; otherwise, the state's ability to
structure relations exclusively with its own citizens would be signifi-
cantly impaired.' 5' Because South Dakota had not attempted to limit
the access of out-of-staters to the state's raw materials nor restricted
the ability of private firms or other states to set up cement plants in-
side South Dakota, it had not violated the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers,152 the Court found that an executive order requiring city-
funded construction contractors to hire at least fifty percent of their
crews from Boston residents did not violate the Commerce Clause.
The Court ruled that the city was acting as a market participant and
that the order covered "a discrete, identifiable class of economic ac-
tivity in which the city is a major participant., 153 In response to the
argument that the requirement went beyond the city's market partici-
pation because it essentially regulated employment contracts between
147 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
148 Id. at 810.
149 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
ISO Id. at 438 n.12.15 Id. at 441.
152 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
153 Id. at211 n.7.
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the public contractors and their subcontractors, the Court held that the
Commerce Clause does not require the city to stop at the boundary of
formal privity of contract.M It also noted that there "are some limits
on a state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that
reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government trans-
acts business," but did not find it necessary to define them in White.
55
The following year, the Court further defined the boundaries of
the market-participant exemption. In South-Central Timber Develop-
ment, Inc. v. Wunnicke,156 the Court held that an Alaskan in-state tim-
ber processing requirement violated the Commerce Clause, even
though Alaska was acting as a participant in its timber market. The
Court distinguished White, stating that there, the crucial fact was that
the employees were all in some way working for the city of Boston.
Here, Alaska "may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regula-
tion, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside"'
' 57
of the market in which the state is a market participant. The Court
also distinguished Reeves by noting that three crucial elements-
foreign commerce, a natural resource, and restrictions on resale-
were present in Alaska's case but not in Reeves.
58
In Natsios, the First Circuit held that Massachusetts was acting as
a market regulator, not a market participant, because it was "attempt-
ing to impose on companies with which it does business conditions
that apply to activities not even remotely connected to such compa-
nies' interactions with Massachusetts."' 59 The state regulated because
the state's restrictive purchasing list continually monitored foreign
investment, not just during the contract period, and the state imposed
conditions on contractors beyond the original transaction-the sign-
ing of the contract-in which the state is a market participant.' 6°
Also, the state's goal of disassociating itself from the "moral taint" of
companies doing business in Burma was beyond the scope of ordi-
nary market participation.
1. Divestment Laws Under a Market-Participant Exemption
Assuming the market-participant exemption applies to the For-
eign Commerce Clause, local divestment laws could survive if the
state acts as a market participant. In White, the Court held that the
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
157 Id. at 97.
158 Id. at 98.
159 NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Crosby v. NFTC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
160 Id. at 65.
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impact of a state law is only considered after it is decided that the city
is regulating the market rather than participating in it.161 Thus, under
White, a future court must consider (1) whether the state is a market
participant and (2) the effect of the state law on interstate commerce.
As the trustee of public funds, a state participates in the private in-
vestment market on behalf of the public, and it engages- in a discrete,
economic activity, contracting and managing the investment of public
funds. Divestment laws will do less harm to interstate commerce than
procurement laws that penalize private firms directly through the loss
of lucrative contracts. However, the First Circuit found Massachusetts
was a regulator because the MBL affected the firms' investment deci-
sions unrelated to their contracts with the state.162 Similarly, state
divestment laws attempt to discourage firms from investing in spe-
cific countries, foreign activities that have little to do with the state's
investment transactions. In order to be eligible for city investment,
firms must be "investment-free" beyond the original investment
transaction with the state. Therefore, firms will suffer some impact,
through the loss of potential or current investors.
However, a state may argue that it is not regulating through its
divestment laws. First, if it can be shown that conditions such as hu-
man rights abuses or poor environmental records have a destabilizing
effect on the long-term profitability of investments, then a state may
argue that its use of such criteria is directly tied to its role as trustee
and manager of public pension funds. 163 Thus, the state's interest in
human rights could be directly related to its role as a market partici-
pant in managing its long-term investments. Second, White allows a
market participant to impose some conditions beyond the contractual
transaction. In Board of Trustees, the court noted that the ordinance,
like the executive order in White, involved "an ongoing commercial
relationship in which the city retained a continuing proprietary inter-
est in the subject of the contract."' 64 As with White's requirement that
fifty percent of city contract workers be Boston residents, the city's
requirement that public funds be invested only in firms with no South
Africa investment was deemed a continuing proprietary interest in the
contract. As states retain a continuing proprietary interest in moni-
toring the performance of the firms in which public funds are in-
vested, the city is justified in imposing conditions that extend beyond
the investment transaction. Unlike the procurement law prohibitions
that remain in effect for the duration of the contract, the state applies
161 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,210 (1983).
162 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 64.
163 See Strumberg, supra note 106, at 150.
.64 Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,752 (Md. 1989).
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its selection criteria simultaneously with its investment transaction
under a divestment law.165
If the above-mentioned linkage between the long-term stability
and profitability of investments and a company's human rights or en-
vironmental record is not accepted, then a question arises as to
whether the state, in imposing human rights criteria in investment
decisions, is acting as an ordinary market participant. A state can be a
market participant if it acts to increase benefits to local residents at
the expense of nonresidents.166 In Board of Trustees, the court held
that a market participant need not benefit exclusively economic inter-
ests.167 Baltimore's ordinance benefited the non-economic local in-
terests: the state favored its citizens and fund beneficiaries by acting
as a "guardian and trustee" in administering local funds in conformity
with its citizens' interests in promoting human rights in South Af-
rica. 168 Also, the opt-out provisions in the Baltimore ordinance and
New York investment bill allow the state to discontinue divestment if
it is financially unreasonable. By allowing for such exceptions, the
state is acting as an ordinary market participant by prioritizing the
fund's performance over the policy.
In sum, because the state acts as a market participant in affirma-
tively selecting investment mechanisms for public funds and divest-
ment policy constitutes a legitimate continuing state interest, divest-
ment laws could pass a Commerce Clause challenge, assuming a
market-participant exemption. The United States suggested in its
MBL amicus brief that, because a state acts as an owner of the com-
panies through its pension funds, it may be a market participant under
a divestment law. 169 Thus, a divestment law would not be seen as a
state's attempt to regulate corporate conduct abroad.
2. Procurement Laws Under a Market-Participant Exemption
This Note will now analyze whether New York's bill and North
Olmsted's resolution are forms of state market participation. In
165 South-Cent. Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984) (distinguishing
Alaska's imposition of conditions into a market "downstream" from the timber sales market
from the continuing relationship between construction contractors and the city in White).
16 Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,442 (1980).
167 Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 750 (citing KS.B. Technical Sales Corp., 381 A.2d at 787,
and noting that only minimal benefits flowed to local citizens from the Buy American law, by
channeling state funds away from foreign firms to domestic firms, some of whom might be
located in New Jersey). See also Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. City of San Francisco, 992 F.
Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (recognizing that the city acted to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, that of ensuring no discrimination against same-sex couples, but invalidating the
ordinance for violating the Dormant Commerce Clause).
168 Briefof Amici Curiae New York City et al., supra note 141, at 8.
169 Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-
474), available at http://www.usaengage.org/background/lawsuit/scbrief.html.
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Reeves v. Stake, the Court upheld South Dakota's preference for in-
state purchasers for its state-produced cement, observing that the
state, having created the interstate market, could withdraw from that
market and favor its own citizens.170 Similarly, in Trojan Technolo-
gies, the court of appeals held that Pennsylvania, as a market partici-
pant, "enjoys the... right to specify to its suppliers the source of
steel" it procured under its Buy American law.' 7' States therefore may
defend procurement laws by arguing that, as in Reeves, state funds
have created a market for the purchase of needed goods and services
and that, as the buyer, they are market participants. States are in-
volved in a discrete economic activity, the purchase of goods and ser-
vices supported by local funds.
However, procurement laws face the same hurdles as do the di-
vestment laws-they target conditions beyond their actual markets.
The First Circuit held that Massachusetts was not a market participant
because it attempted to impose conditions in markets unconnected to
the transaction with the state.172 Thus, Massachusetts' conduct was
similar to Alaska's in South-Central Timber, where the state required
all purchasers of timber produced on state lands to also process that
timber inside the state with in-state processors. By imposing post-
purchase conditions in downstream markets (processing market) in
which it was not a participant (sale of timber market), the state at-
tempted to govern the private, separate economic relationships of its
trading partners. 173
First, states can attempt to distinguish South-Central Timber, be-
cause three elements identified by the Court as key to its decision to
limit downstream conditions-a natural resource, foreign commerce,
and restrictions on re-sale 74 -are not all present in the case of a pro-
curement law. Second, commentators suggest that South-Central
Timber can be read more narrowly to prohibit states from imposing
downstream conditions only. 175 A future court could find that a pro-
curement law imposed a condition precedent-preferring firms that
did no business in Burma-to contracting with the state. Similarly,
the North Olmsted requirement that suppliers certify their goods were
not produced in sweatshop conditions is a condition precedent to con-
clude a contract with the city. The New York bill requires a contrac-
17o Reeves, 447 U.S. at441.
71 Trojan Tech. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990).
'72 NFrC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 64 (1st Cir. 1999), afd sub nom. Crosby v. NFTC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
1 South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,99 (1984).
'74 I. at 95-96.
175 Dhooge, supra note 66, at 467 (arguing that Alaska's requirement of in-state processing
can be characterized as providing for after-the-fact state participation in South-Central Timber).
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tor to stipulate as a material condition of the contract that it conducts
no business in specific countries for the term of its contract. 176 If the
human rights requirement is a condition of the contract, then New
York can argue that the bill does not impose any downstream condi-
tions on the contractor. If the state later discovers that a contractor
has business in a specific country, then subsequent state enforcement
actions would relate to a breach of a material condition of the con-
tract, not the imposition of downstream regulation.
However, procurement laws may still fail because the state at-
tempts to regulate activities unconnected with the state. In White, the
Court found the Mayor's hiring requirement acceptable because the
city imposed the resident-hiring requirement only on construction
contracts with the city, not on all construction firm contracts. 17n The
fact that the New York bill limits investment in specific countries
only during the contract period does not help it here, because the
company may have no investment at all. The North Olmsted resolu-
tion would pass because it imposes the sweatshop restrictions only for
goods supplied to the city. North Olmsted could argue that, as in
Reeves, the city does not impose conditions beyond its own procure-
ment market. The resolution does not touch on a company's diverse
investments or contracts with a foreign government or foreign suppli-
ers. Indeed, it would be possible to comply with the North Olmstead
resolution if a potential bidder maintained separate suppliers-one
with non-sweatshop goods for city contracts, and another supplier for
less scrupulous customers. Because the North Olmsted law limited its
interest to goods produced only for the city and does not attempt to
limit business decisions beyond the city contracts, it does not impose
the restriction found in the MBL. If the New York bill focused its
prohibition on goods supplied to the state, 178 rather than monitoring
contractor foreign investment, the bill might also pass muster.
The court must also find that the state, in adopting human rights
or other non-economic criteria, is acting as a market participant. The
First Circuit held that Massachusetts had not acted as a market par-
ticipant in conditioning contract awards on noninvolvement in
Burma. 179 States defending procurement laws face somewhat differ-
ent challenges in proving local benefit than do those with divestment
176 See A.B. 9514, 2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 5(A) (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87. § 5(A)
requires the State to insert the no-business policy into the contract as a material condition and
not as a criteria for award of the state's bid, as in MBL.
177 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,211 (1983).
'7" See A.B. 9514,2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 5(A)(2) (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87.
179 NFrC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 65 (st Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. Crosby v. NFTC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000) (noting that "[tihe proper inquiry is whether Massachusetts is acting as an
ordinary market participant would act, not whether any participant has acted in such a fashion").
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laws. While states may defend divestment laws or investment poli-
cies based on the hypothesis that corporate investments in countries
with poor human rights or environmental records may lead to a riskier
or less stable investment, goods supplied to a state procurer from
countries with slave labor arguably may be cheaper to the local con-
sumer. However, in enacting procurement laws, state and local offi-
cials are responding to citizens' demands for increased accountability
for human rights. The Court has recognized that states serve legiti-
mate citizen interests that are both economic and non-economic in
nature. For example, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., the Court
noted with approval Maryland's decision to pay bounties favoring in-
state scrap processors to protect the environment.18 0 A plurality of the
Court has also recognized that local governments have a compelling
interest in assuring that public dollars do not support racially dis-
criminatory activities.181 Thus, states may argue that citizens are will-
ing to internalize the costs of slightly higher priced goods for the as-
surance that the producer of these goods makes a living wage or has
decent working conditions. According to such an argument, part of
the legitimate state interest in procurement is the right to allocate re-
sources according to the needs and priorities of citizens.
182
The market-participant exemption should be extended to pro-
curement and divestment laws. The state furthers the economic and
political interests of its citizens by taking human rights into account,
as this internalizes the hidden costs of human rights abuses or envi-
ronmental concerns into the state's purchasing costs. Assuming a
market-participant exemption, divestment and procurement laws
would pass muster, with some modifications. The laws should target
conditions, such as labor rights or human rights, rather than country-
specific criteria. Procurement laws should be limited to goods sup-
plied to the locality. The more a state attempts to influence a corpora-
tion's choice of partners or have an impact on markets beyond the
state procurement market, the less likely the laws will survive a
Commerce Clause challenge.
,so Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,809 (1976).
.81 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (discussing race dis-
crimination and noting that government involvement in private discrimination may be unconsti-
tutional). See also Air Transport Ass'n of Am. V. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149,
1164 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (noting city's legitimate public interest in protecting same sex couples
from discrimination under city contracts).
18 Brief of Amici Curiae New York City et al., supra note 141, at 9.
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause Without a Market-Participant
Exemption
If the state is not protected by the market-participant exemption,
the court must next examine whether the state statute violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause. In Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa
Department of Revenue and Finance,183 the Court invalidated an Iowa
tax provision that allowed a dividend deduction for domestic subsidi-
aries but not for foreign subsidiaries under the Dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause. The Court outlined its test under the Commerce
Clause: "Absent a compelling justification ... a State may not ad-
vance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against
foreign commerce.'184 If the Court finds that the law "facially dis-
criminates" against foreign commerce, the law is "virtually per se
invalid" and is struck down.' 85 If the law does not facially discrimi-
nate, the Court will apply a balancing test to consider if the regulation
has an incidental effect on interstate commerce by considering
whether the burden on commerce clearly exceeds the putative local
benefits. 186 In Kraft General Foods, the Court rejected Iowa's argu-
ments that the regulation did not favor local interests and that it pro-
moted administrative convenience. Since the Constitution grants
greater protection against state taxation for foreign commerce because
of national concerns about retaliation and the need for uniformity, the
absence of a local benefit did not eliminate the international con-
cerns. 187
As the Court more rigorously scrutinizes state laws under the
Foreign Commerce Clause, it applies added tests to those under the
Commerce Clause. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Board,188 the Court upheld California's tax reporting system against a
claim that it resulted in double taxation for multinational enterprises,
thus regulating foreign commerce. The Court held that a state tax
could have "foreign resonances," that would not directly influence
foreign affairs. 189 If so, the Court will not infer that Congress in-
tended to require states to adopt a federal system, unless Congress
explicitly gave such direction.190 In a related case, Barclays Bank v.
113 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
'"4 ld. at 8 1.
18- Facial "'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (invalidating an Oregon surcharge on
disposal of out-of-state solid waste in the state).
I6 Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
187 Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 505 U.S. at 79-82.
18 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
189 See id. at 193-94.
190 Id. at 194.
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Franchise Tax Board of California,191 the Court again upheld the
California tax system under a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge,
this time brought by a foreign corporation, Barclays. The Court ar-
ticulated an additional test: whether the state law impaired federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential and thus
prevented the government from speaking with one voice in interna-
tional trade.192 The Court considered existing federal laws, treaties,
and policies to determine congressional intent to develop a uniform
system. The Court then concluded: "[G]iven these indicia of Con-
gress' willingness to tolerate States' . . . reporting mandates, even
when those mandates are applied to foreign corporations ... we can-
not conclude that the foreign policy of the United States-whose nu-
ances.., are much more the province of the Executive Branch and
Congress than of this Court-is [so] seriously threatened ... as to
warrant our intervention."'193
The First Circuit determined that the MBL facially discriminated
against foreign commerce because the law's goal was to affect busi-
ness decisions concerning a foreign nation. 194 The Foreign Com-
merce Clause, noted the court, applies both to regulation of foreign
companies and domestic companies operating overseas. Thus, the
fact that the MBL applied evenly to both domestic and foreign com-
panies did not save it because the law still discriminated against all
companies with business in Burma, and the absence of local benefits
was irrelevant. 195 The MBL impaired the federal ability to speak with
one voice because, unlike in Barclays, Congress intended to establish
a uniform rule through the FBL.196 Finally, the MBL regulated be-
yond the national borders and the state failed to show a legitimate
local interest for the law.
1. Divestment Laws and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Divestment laws will survive a Foreign Commerce Clause chal-
lenge if they do not facially discriminate against foreign commerce
and do not conflict with the need for federal uniformity. In Board of
Trustees, the court found that Baltimore's South Africa divestment
ordinance did not facially discriminate because (1) it applied even-
'9' 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
192 Id. at320.
'9' Barclays, 512 U.S. at 327 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196). The Court noted
that the "judiciary is not vested with power to decide 'how to balance a particular risk of retalia-
tion against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they
please."' Id. at 328 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194).
194 NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,68 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299,317 (1851)), aff'dsub nom. Crosby v. NFrC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
195 Id. at 67.
196 Id. at 68.
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handedly to all firms in which the city might invest, and (2) the law
was not intended to favor local interests at the expense of businesses
elsewhere. 197 Board of Trustees' analysis has been superseded by the
current Domestic and Foreign Commerce Clause cases, as illustrated
in Kraft General Foods.198 Under these cases, a law that discrimi-
nates against all firms, foreign and domestic, with business in South
Africa violates the Foreign Commerce Clause and the absence of lo-
cal benefits is irrelevant. The First Circuit found facial discrimination
because the MBL penalized any businesses doing business in Burma,
foreign and domestic firms alike.199 One could argue that an invest-
ment decision does not necessarily burden foreign commerce because
it does not automatically cause a company to lose profits, although
the company does lose current or potential investors. However, the
Massachusetts and New York bills would fail under the Foreign
Commerce Clause because they discriminate against all entities with
business in specific countries and favor business without particular
foreign interests. Neither the absence of local benefit nor a state in-
terest will save a per se violation. A condition-specific law targeting
human rights or environmental policy will not fail as it applies to all
firms, foreign and domestic, regardless of whether they participate in
foreign commerce or not, and thus does not facially discriminate
against foreign commerce.
If a law does not facially discriminate, a court will examine
whether the burden on foreign commerce is clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the local benefits. In Board of Trustees, the court held that the
divestment ordinance burdened the interstate sale of securities. How-
ever, this was outweighed by the city's interest in condemning racial
discrimination by refusing to invest in South Africa, especially where
its citizens felt strongly about slavery. 2°° A condition-specific law
reflects a powerful state interest in ensuring that public funds are in-
vested consistently with citizen interests, but this may not be suffi-
ciently compelling to outweigh the burden of the regulation on for-
eign (and domestic) commerce.201
197 Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,754 (Md. 1989).198 Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 82 (1992)
(holding absence of local benefit irrelevant to finding of per se facial discrimination); see also
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (holding in-state process-
ing requirement for recyclable waste invalid per se under Commerce Clause unless city could
show there was no other means to advance a local legitimate interest); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (invalidating New Jersey law banning the disposal of out-
of-state waste in the state despite claim of environmental/safety purpose).
199 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67-68.
200 Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 755-56.
201 See supra note 198 for recent cases rejecting similar state interests.
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Additionally, divestment laws do not impair the federal govern-
ment's ability to speak with one voice. In deciding that the govern-
ment did not intend to impose a uniform tax system, the Barclays
Court noted Congress' awareness of the need for a uniform system
and its failure to pass a bill. °  Thus, the state law did not impair the
government's ability to speak with one voice. Similarly, there is no
international treaty or federal law governing divestment. The nature
of a divestment decision produces only a foreign resonance, because
the transaction is directed at the U.S. private sector and not at the of-
fending country itself. In Barclays, the Court deferred the decision of
choosing between the risk of foreign retaliation and states' rights to
implement their tax policies to Congress and the executive branch. 203
Unless either body adopts a policy or law, divestment laws will not
impair the federal government's ability to speak with one voice.
Divestment laws targeting a country will not survive a Foreign
Commerce Clause challenge as the laws facially discriminate against
foreign commerce and any firm doing business in a specified country.
Moreover, condition-specific laws may also fail because it is doubtful
whether the state's interest to ensure investment consistent with citi-
zen interests would qualify as a compelling justification to outweigh
the law's impact on foreign commerce. Divestment laws pass the
Barclays Foreign Commerce Clause test, because the lack of a con-
gressional or federal policy concerning divestment shows there is no
need for federal uniformity.
2. Procurement Laws and the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Note will next analyze whether the New York bill and North
Olmsted resolution could pass a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge.
The First Circuit found the MBL clearly discriminated against com-
panies, both domestic and foreign, which did business in Burma.
Similarly, the New York bill discriminates against companies that do
business in the specified countries by requiring that these companies
submit bids that are five percent lower than the lowest bid or that they
certify they have no prohibited foreign investments.2 4 Since compa-
nies with particular holdings are burdened, the New York bill would
be invalid under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
In contrast, the North Olmsted resolution applies equally to all
companies foreign and domestic, with and without foreign invest-
ments. The only requirement is that goods supplied to the city not be
m Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298,324-28 (1994).
2' Id at 327-28.
2o4 See A.B. 9514,2000 Leg., 223d Legis. Sess. § 5(A) (N.Y. 1999), supra note 87.
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made with sweatshop or slave labor.20 5 The law does not facially dis-
criminate against foreign commerce as it applies evenly to companies
regardless of location or nature of business. Under the balancing test,
the court would consider whether the burden on interstate commerce
was excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Here, the state
has a direct interest in controlling its procurement and ensuring that
citizen interests are protected. It might also have a police power in-
terest in protecting local workers from substandard working condi-
tions. North Olmsted could argue that its procurement interest should
outweigh the minimal financial burden the city imposes on foreign
commerce, especially as contractors could feasibly maintain several
suppliers and pass the costs on to the state. 2
6
If the state law does not facially discriminate, the court would
next consider whether the law conflicted with a need for federal uni-
formity. In Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, which pre-
dates Barclays, the court held that the state's Buy American statute
did not impair federal uniformity, because "Congress is aware of state
activity ... and has not yet imposed a policy of national uniform-
ity."2°7 The court also noted that state procurement policy was not
"an area where federal uniformity is essential., 20 8 The First Circuit
did not apply Barclays to the MBL in its Foreign Commerce Clause
analysis, noting that the California law in Barclays was not chal-
lenged under the Supremacy Clause.2°9 Thus, Barclays "did not dis-
cuss how courts should address Supremacy Clause challenges to state
laws that impact foreign affairs,"'210 such as the MBL.
If the Barclays test applies, procurement laws may not be invali-
dated because of the need for federal uniformity. Currently, there are
no federal laws regarding the persecution of Christians, although the
New York bill might still fail under the existing federal sanctions in
certain countries. North Olmsted's resolution would also pass, in the
absence of conflicting federal laws governing international labor
rights.21' One remaining obstacle is that Congress is currently con-
205 See City of North Olmsted, Ohio Res. No. 97-9 (1998), supra note 119.
206 But see supra note 198 (showing that the Supreme Court has set a high bar for legiti-
mate state interests under the Commerce Clause).
207 916 F.2d 903, 912 (3rd Cir. 1990).
208 Id.
209 NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 72 (Ist Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nora. Crosby v. NFTC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
210 id.
211 See Stumberg, supra note 106, at 139-42 (arguing that post-Crosby primary boycotts
would survive preemption scrutiny). The U.S. has ratified United Nations conventions support-
ing workers' rights of association, freedom from forced relocation, and freedom from forced
labor. Professor Stumberg argues that the convention prohibiting forced labor, which is imple-
mented under the International Labor Organization (ILO), allows for independent state action,
including a primary boycott adopted by the state. Id.
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sidering a comprehensive federal sanctions bill to promote a coherent
federal sanctions policy.21 2 In Barclays, Congress had considered
imposing a uniform reporting regime, but failed to pass a law. There-
fore, the Court decided that the state law did not impair the federal
government's ability to speak with one voice.213 While the federal
sanctions bill does not expressly preempt state or local sanctions, un-
der Crosby a court would hold that Congress intended to require fed-
eral uniformity for sanctions. Thus, the New York bill and North
Olmsted ordinance would be invalid, as both apply additional sanc-
tions to a federal policy. Procurement laws targeting a specific coun-
try would fail because they discriminate against foreign commerce. A
condition-specific law may withstand a Foreign Commerce Clause
challenge, as it applies evenly to all commerce; however, a court may
reject state procurement interest as a legitimate justification under the
balancing test. In the absence of an explicit federal need for uniform-
ity, the court would likely defer to Congress to decide whether the
state's right to impose regulations on commerce outweighs the inci-
dental impacts on foreign commerce. The possibility of a comprehen-
sive federal sanctions law would, of course, invalidate the procure-
ment laws.
CONCLUSION
Crosby did not entirely vitiate the states' ability to impose norma-
tive restrictions in its procurement or investment functions that may
affect foreign countries. A key lesson is that the more a state attempts
to influence a corporation's choice of partners or have an impact on
markets beyond the state procurement market, the less likely the laws
will survive either a Foreign Affairs Power or Dormant Commerce
Clause challenge. The more general the language and the less detailed
the procedural or enforcement mechanisms, however, the less effec-
tive the law will be as an engine of social change and the more likely
it will be an aspirational statement.
Divestment laws will be most successful in meeting any legal
challenges. The law will pass muster if the law (1) does not target
specific countries, but focuses on conditions (human rights, environ-
mental protection), (2) articulates an economic justification for taking
conditions into account, (3) contains a reasonable time frame for di-
212 Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 105th Cong. (1998), LEXIS 1999 S.757; Jacob
Heilbrunn, The Sanctions Sellout, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 1998, at 16 (discussing implications
of a federal sanctions reform bill pending in Congress). For recommendations on federal sanc-
tions reform, see DOUGLAS JOHNSTON & SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, ALTERING U.S. SANCTIONS
POLICY: FINAL REPORT ON THE CSIS PROJECT ON UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (Ctr. for
Strategic Int'l Studies Panel Report, 1999).
213 Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298,327 (1994).
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vestment to reduce the impact on financial institutions, and (4) mini-
mizes ongoing scrutiny of the situation abroad. While the divestment
mechanism is certainly a weaker policy tool than selective contract-
ing, states may find it the optimal mechanism for promoting citizens'
interests. The future for procurement laws is less bright. States may
still enact procurement laws, absent a preempting federal law, if they
are modified to focus on conditions. In general, the greater specificity
and burden a state imposes on private corporations, the less likely a
procurement law will survive either a Commerce Clause or Foreign
Affairs Power challenge.
The Massachusetts Burma Law raises broader questions that
must be answered in this era of inevitable global economic integra-
tion. Will local laws governing traditional state areas (for example,
procurement or health and safety standards) be swept away by inter-
national trade treaties? Should citizens have some say in foreign af-
fairs at the local level, especially when the federal government refuses
or is unable to act? After Crosby, states can continue to express their
policy preferences, albeit in a more muted and generalized fashion.
WENDY L. WALLACE t
1 Thanks to Professor Jonathan L. Entin for his helpfiul suggestions on this Note.
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